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An Anti‐Epistemicist Consequence of Margin for Error Semantics for Knowledge
Author(s) -
GRAFF DELIA
Publication year - 2002
Publication title -
philosophy and phenomenological research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.7
H-Index - 39
eISSN - 1933-1592
pISSN - 0031-8205
DOI - 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00146.x
Subject(s) - vagueness , margin (machine learning) , semantics (computer science) , citation , computer science , linguistics , information retrieval , artificial intelligence , library science , philosophy , programming language , machine learning , fuzzy logic
1. Transparent Propositions and Margin for Error Semantics Let us say that the proposition that p is transparent just in case it is known that p, and it is known that it is known that p, and it is known that it is known that it is known that p, and so on, for any number of iterations of the knowledge operator 'it is known that'. If there are transparent propositions at all, then the claim that any man with zero hairs is bald seems like a good candidate. We know that any man with zero hairs is bald. And it also does not seem completely implausible that we know that we know it, and that we know that we know that we know it, and so on. Mario G6mez-Torrente (1997, p. 244) observes that if B(O) is transparent (where in general, B(n) stands for the claim that any man with n hairs is bald), then not all of the following of Timothy Williamson's margin for error principles can be true.