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Two Conceptions of the Physical
Author(s) -
STOLJAR DANIEL
Publication year - 2001
Publication title -
philosophy and phenomenological research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.7
H-Index - 39
eISSN - 1933-1592
pISSN - 0031-8205
DOI - 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00056.x
Subject(s) - physicalism , epistemology , philosophy , a priori and a posteriori , philosophy of mind , object (grammar) , metaphysics , linguistics
The debate over physicalism in philosophy of mind can be seen as concerning an inconsistent tetrad of theses: (1) if physicalism is true, a priori physicalism is true; (2) a priori physicalism is false; (3) if physicalism is false, epiphenomenalism is true; (4) epiphenomenalism is false. This paper argues that one may resolve the debate by distinguishing two conceptions of the physical: on the theory‐based conception , it is plausible that (2) is true and (3) is false; on the object‐based conception , it is plausible that (3) is true and (2) is false. the paper also defends and explores the version of physicalism that results from this strategy.