Premium
The Effect of Board Independence on Target Shareholder Wealth
Author(s) -
Clarkson Peter M.,
Craswell Allen,
Mackenzie Prue
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
australian accounting review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.551
H-Index - 36
eISSN - 1835-2561
pISSN - 1035-6908
DOI - 10.1111/j.1835-2561.2008.0015.x
Subject(s) - shareholder , business , accounting , reputation , independence (probability theory) , corporate governance , finance , statistics , mathematics , social science , sociology
We seek insights into whether, and if so how, an independent board enhances the bid premiums offered to target firm shareholders during a takeover. The results indicate that the presence of an independent board enhances the initial bid premium by, on average, 21.1%. However, the results of more refined analysis suggest that the enhanced bid premium is in fact driven by independent boards comprising non‐executive directors who have reputation capital at stake. We also find that independent boards that resist takeovers or include voluntary independent expert reports in target statements, increase the bid premium revision by, on average, 15.6% and 16.2%, respectively.