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CURRENCY BOARD ARRANGEMENTS AS A SUPER‐FIXED ALTERNATIVE IN THE CHOICE OF EXCHANGE RATE REGIME 1
Author(s) -
Wessels Buks
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
south african journal of economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.502
H-Index - 31
eISSN - 1813-6982
pISSN - 0038-2280
DOI - 10.1111/j.1813-6982.2007.00145.x
Subject(s) - currency board , exchange rate , currency , monetary economics , economics , speculation , exchange rate regime , credibility , inflation (cosmology) , floating exchange rate , interest rate parity , international economics , macroeconomics , physics , theoretical physics , law , political science
Currency board arrangements (CBAs) are currently widely proposed as a super‐fixed exchange rate solution to exchange rate volatility. This paper researches the nature, operation, benefits and disadvantages of CBAs. Benefits comprise improved policy credibility, lower inflation and interest rate levels, increased economic growth, increased foreign capital flows, and sharply reduced currency speculation. These are compared with the shortcomings of CBAs, such as the absence of a lender of last resort, real exchange rate misalignments and their consequences for the economy. The paper identifies the type of country that would be the most likely candidate to benefit from a CBA.