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CONCEPTUAL RELATIVITY AND METAPHYSICAL REALISM
Author(s) -
Horgan Terry,
Timmons Mark
Publication year - 2002
Publication title -
philosophical issues
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.638
H-Index - 18
eISSN - 1758-2237
pISSN - 1533-6077
DOI - 10.1111/j.1758-2237.2002.tb00062.x
Subject(s) - metaphysics , realism , citation , epistemology , philosophy , computer science , library science
Is conceptual relativity a genuine phenomenon? If so, how is it properly understood? And if it does occur, does it undermine metaphysical realism? These are the questions we propose to address. We will argue that conceptual relativity is indeed a genuine phenomenon, albeit an extremely puzzling one. We will offer an account of it. And we will argue that it is entirely compatible with metaphysical realism. Metaphysical realism is the view that there is a world of objects and properties that is independent of our thought and discourse ~including our schemes of concepts! about such a world. Hilary Putnam, a former proponent of metaphysical realism, later gave it up largely because of the alleged phenomenon that he himself has given the label ‘conceptual relativity’. One of the key ideas of conceptual relativity is that certain concepts—including such fundamental concepts as object, entity, and existence—have a multiplicity of different and incompatible uses~Putnam 1987, p. 19; 1988, pp. 110–14 !. According to Putnam, once we recognize the phenomenon of conceptual relativity we must reject metaphysical realism: