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Philosophy for the Rest of Cognitive Science
Author(s) -
Stepp Nigel,
Chemero Anthony,
Turvey Michael T.
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
topics in cognitive science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.191
H-Index - 56
eISSN - 1756-8765
pISSN - 1756-8757
DOI - 10.1111/j.1756-8765.2011.01143.x
Subject(s) - anticipation (artificial intelligence) , cognition , philosophy of science , cognitive science , diversity (politics) , epistemology , lida , philosophy of mind , rest (music) , psychology , sociology , computer science , philosophy , cognitive model , artificial intelligence , metaphysics , neuroscience , medicine , cardiology , anthropology
Cognitive science has always included multiple methodologies and theoretical commitments. The philosophy of cognitive science should embrace, or at least acknowledge, this diversity. Bechtel’s (2009a) proposed philosophy of cognitive science, however, applies only to representationalist and mechanist cognitive science, ignoring the substantial minority of dynamically oriented cognitive scientists. As an example of nonrepresentational, dynamical cognitive science, we describe strong anticipation as a model for circadian systems (Stepp & Turvey, 2009). We then propose a philosophy of science appropriate to nonrepresentational, dynamical cognitive science.