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Why Reject a Sensory Imagery Theory of Control Consciousness?
Author(s) -
Mylopoulos Myrto I.
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
topics in cognitive science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.191
H-Index - 56
eISSN - 1756-8765
pISSN - 1756-8757
DOI - 10.1111/j.1756-8765.2011.01136.x
Subject(s) - consciousness , control (management) , electromagnetic theories of consciousness , sensory system , integrated information theory , psychology , cognitive science , motor control , cognitive psychology , computer science , artificial intelligence , neuroscience
Mandik (2010) defends a motor theory of control consciousness according to which nonsensory states, like motor commands, directly contribute to the awareness we have of ourselves as being in control of our actions. Along the way, he argues that his theory is to be preferred over Prinz’s (2007) sensory imagery theory, which denies that nonsensory states play any direct role in the generation of control consciousness. I argue that Mandik’s criticisms of Prinz’s theory fall short, but that nonetheless there are reasons to favor a motor theory of control consciousness over a sensory imagery theory.