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Moral Reasoning: Hints and Allegations
Author(s) -
Paxton Joseph M.,
Greene Joshua D.
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
topics in cognitive science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.191
H-Index - 56
eISSN - 1756-8765
pISSN - 1756-8757
DOI - 10.1111/j.1756-8765.2010.01096.x
Subject(s) - social intuitionism , moral reasoning , moral disengagement , moral psychology , intuition , social cognitive theory of morality , psychology , moral authority , epistemology , moral development , social psychology , cognitive science , philosophy
Recent research in moral psychology highlights the role of emotion and intuition in moral judgment. In the wake of these findings, the role and significance of moral reasoning remain uncertain. In this article, we distinguish among different kinds of moral reasoning and review evidence suggesting that at least some kinds of moral reasoning play significant roles in moral judgment, including roles in abandoning moral intuitions in the absence of justifying reasons, applying both deontological and utilitarian moral principles, and counteracting automatic tendencies toward bias that would otherwise dominate behavior. We argue that little is known about the psychology of moral reasoning and that it may yet prove to be a potent social force.