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Accidental death and the rule of joint and several liability
Author(s) -
Carvell Daniel,
Currie Janet,
MacLeod W. Bentley
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
the rand journal of economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 3.687
H-Index - 108
eISSN - 1756-2171
pISSN - 0741-6261
DOI - 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00158.x
Subject(s) - plaintiff , harm , liability , joint and several liability , incentive , tort , tort reform , accidental , law and economics , work (physics) , burden of proof , law , joint (building) , actuarial science , business , political science , economics , engineering , microeconomics , mechanical engineering , architectural engineering , physics , acoustics
Most U.S. states have enacted JSL reform, the move from a regime of joint and several liability (JSL) that allows plaintiffs to claim full recovery from any one of multiple defendants to one where defendants are held liable only for the harm they cause. Contrary to previous theoretical work, we show that JSL reform can increase precaution by judgment proof agent by giving “deep pockets” an incentive to reduce their own liability by bringing judgment‐proof agents into court. This result can help explain our empirical findings showing that JSL reform reduces death rates (and hence increase precaution) for many types of accidents. Together, these results highlight the role that litigation costs and judgment‐proof agents play in the functioning of the American tort system .