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Retailers' choice of product variety and exclusive dealing under asymmetric information
Author(s) -
Yehezkel Yaron
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
the rand journal of economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 3.687
H-Index - 108
eISSN - 1756-2171
pISSN - 0741-6261
DOI - 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00006.x
Subject(s) - upstream (networking) , vertical integration , downstream (manufacturing) , variety (cybernetics) , product (mathematics) , quality (philosophy) , information asymmetry , business , vertical restraints , industrial organization , microeconomics , economics , marketing , computer science , mathematics , incentive , computer network , philosophy , geometry , epistemology , artificial intelligence
This article considers vertical relations between an upstream manufacturer and a downstream retailer that can independently obtain a low‐quality, discount substitute. The analysis reveals that under full information, the retailer offers both varieties if and only if it is optimal to do so under vertical integration. However, when the retailer is privately informed about demand, it offers both varieties even if under vertical integration it is profitable to offer only the manufacturer's product. If the manufacturer can impose exclusive dealing, then under asymmetric information it will do so and foreclose the low‐quality substitute even if under vertical integration it is profitable to offer both varieties.