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Rules of proof, courts, and incentives
Author(s) -
Demougin Dominique,
Fluet Claude
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
the rand journal of economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 3.687
H-Index - 108
eISSN - 1756-2171
pISSN - 0741-6261
DOI - 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00002.x
Subject(s) - incentive , imperfect , civil litigation , tort , tort reform , law and economics , burden of proof , civil procedure , arbitration , business , standard of care , economics , law , political science , microeconomics , liability , linguistics , philosophy , medicine , surgery
We analyze the design of legal principles and procedures for court decision making in civil litigation. The objective is the provision of incentives for potential tort‐feasors to exert care when evidence is imperfect and may be distorted by the parties. Efficiency is consistent with courts adjudicating on the basis of the preponderance of evidence standard together with common law exclusionary rules. Inefficient equilibria may nevertheless also arise under these rules. Burden of proof guidelines are then useful as a coordination device. Alternatively, guidelines are unnecessary if courts are allowed a more active or inquisitorial role in contrast to that of passive adjudicator.