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Long‐run price competition
Author(s) -
Dutta Prajit,
Matros Alexander,
Weibull Jörgen W.
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
the rand journal of economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 3.687
H-Index - 108
eISSN - 1756-2171
pISSN - 0741-6261
DOI - 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2007.tb00069.x
Subject(s) - collusion , economics , oligopoly , microeconomics , competition (biology) , durable good , repeated game , price setting , bertrand competition , game theory , cournot competition , ecology , biology
We generalize the standard repeated‐games model of dynamic oligopolistic competition to allow for consumers who are long‐lived and forward looking. Each period leaves some residual demand to future periods and pricing in one period affects consumers' expectations about future prices. We analyze this setting for an indivisible durable good with price‐setting firms and overlapping cohorts of consumers. The model nests the repeated‐game model and the Coasian durable‐goods model as its two extreme cases. The analysis is mostly focused on constant‐price collusion but conditions for collusive recurrent sales are also identified.