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Profit sharing (with workers) facilitates collusion (among firms)
Author(s) -
Bernhardt Dan,
Chambers Christopher P.
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
the rand journal of economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 3.687
H-Index - 108
eISSN - 1756-2171
pISSN - 0741-6261
DOI - 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00027.x
Subject(s) - collusion , cartel , profit sharing , oligopoly , microeconomics , incentive , wage , profit (economics) , tying , economics , business , industrial organization , cournot competition , labour economics , finance
We show how profit sharing by firms with workers facilitates collusion among firms in a dynamic oligopoly environment with uncertain demand. We first show that firm profits can always be increased by tying wages to market conditions. The optimal agreement takes the form of an option and features partial sharing because increased sharing raises the expected price‐wage differential, but reduces price‐wage variability. We then show that given any cartel, there exist market conditions such that simply giving some expected profit to workers raises expected firm profits via the transfer's impact on the incentive to cheat on the cartel.