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Unreliable Intuitions: A New Reply to the Moral Twin‐Earth Argument
Author(s) -
Sonderholm Jorn
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
theoria
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.34
H-Index - 16
eISSN - 1755-2567
pISSN - 0040-5825
DOI - 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2012.01150.x
Subject(s) - argument (complex analysis) , philosophy , epistemology , realism , moral realism , moral psychology , biochemistry , chemistry
This article is concerned with M ark T immons and T erence H organ's influential twin‐earth argument against the semantic views of that school of thought in metaethics that has come to be known as “ C ornell realism”. The semantic views of C ornell realism have been developed in greatest detail by R ichard B oyd, and it is B oyd's view that is targeted by T immons and Horgan. In the first part of the article, the twin‐earth argument is introduced and two versions of it are disentangled. Thereafter, a defensive strategy is developed against the most powerful version of the argument. The conclusion of the article is that T immons and H organ's argument does not succeed in showing that the semantic views associated with C ornell realism are false.