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Making Sense of Doubt: Strawson's Anti‐Scepticism
Author(s) -
CALLANAN JOHN. J.
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
theoria
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.34
H-Index - 16
eISSN - 1755-2567
pISSN - 0040-5825
DOI - 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2011.01107.x
Subject(s) - skepticism , transcendental number , epistemology , naturalism , philosophy , transcendental idealism , interpretation (philosophy) , transcendental philosophy , linguistics
Strawson's philosophical attitude towards scepticism is frequently thought to have undergone a significant shift from the “strong” or “robust” employment of transcendental arguments in Individuals to a more “modest” understanding of the efficacy of such arguments in Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties . I argue that this interpretation is based upon a misunderstanding of the function of transcendental arguments in Strawson's earlier works. Examining the continuity of Strawson's modest naturalistic approach to scepticism can offer some insight as to the continuing overestimation of the anti‐sceptical efficacy of transcendental arguments.