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Reliability and Future True Belief: Reply to Olsson and Jönsson
Author(s) -
JÄGER CHRISTOPH
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
theoria
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.34
H-Index - 16
eISSN - 1755-2567
pISSN - 0040-5825
DOI - 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2011.01104.x
Subject(s) - constructive , argument (complex analysis) , epistemology , value (mathematics) , philosophy , reliability (semiconductor) , psychology , process (computing) , mathematics , computer science , statistics , physics , biochemistry , chemistry , power (physics) , quantum mechanics , operating system
In “Process Reliabilism and the Value Problem” I argue that Erik Olsson and Alvin Goldman's conditional probability solution to the value problem in epistemology is unsuccessful and that it makes significant internalist concessions. In “Kinds of Learning and the Likelihood of Future True Beliefs” Olsson and Martin Jönsson try to show that my argument does “not in the end reduce the plausibility” of Olsson and Goldman's account. Here I argue that, while Olsson and Jönsson clarify and amend the conditional probability approach in a number of helpful ways, my case against it remains intact. I conclude with a constructive proposal as to how their account may be steered in a more promising direction.