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Process Reliabilism and the Value Problem
Author(s) -
JÄGER CHRISTOPH
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
theoria
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.34
H-Index - 16
eISSN - 1755-2567
pISSN - 0040-5825
DOI - 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2011.01102.x
Subject(s) - externalism , epistemology , value (mathematics) , subject (documents) , philosophy , simple (philosophy) , internalism and externalism , process (computing) , mathematical economics , mathematics , computer science , statistics , library science , operating system
Alvin Goldman and Erik Olsson have recently proposed a novel solution to the value problem in epistemology, i.e., to the question of how to account for the apparent surplus value of knowledge over mere true belief. Their “conditional probability solution” maintains that even simple process reliabilism can account for the added value of knowledge, since forming true beliefs in a reliable way raises the objective probability that the subject will have more true belief of a similar kind in the future. I argue that this proposal confronts significant internal problems and implicitly invokes higher‐level epistemic conditions that run against the spirit of externalism.