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Moore's Paradox, Defective Interpretation, Justified Belief and Conscious Belief
Author(s) -
WILLIAMS JOHN N.
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
theoria
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.34
H-Index - 16
eISSN - 1755-2567
pISSN - 0040-5825
DOI - 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2010.01073.x
Subject(s) - interpretation (philosophy) , assertion , epistemology , philosophy , order (exchange) , belief revision , sentence , doxastic logic , psychology , linguistics , computer science , finance , economics , programming language
In this journal, Hamid Vahid argues against three families of explanation of Moore‐paradoxicality. The first is the Wittgensteinian approach ; I assert that p just in case I assert that I believe that p. So making a Moore‐paradoxical assertion involves contradictory assertions. The second is the epistemic approach , one committed to: if I am justified in believing that p then I am justified in believing that I believe that p . So it is impossible to have a justified omissive Moore‐paradoxical belief. The third is the conscious belief approach , being committed to: if I consciously believe that p then I believe that I believe that p . So if I have a conscious omissive Moore‐paradoxical belief, then I have contradictory second‐order beliefs. In their place, Vahid argues for the defective‐interpretation approach , broadly that charity requires us to discount the utterer of a Moore‐paradoxical sentence as a speaker. I agree that the Wittgensteinian approach is unsatisfactory. But so is the defective‐interpretation approach. However, there is a satisfactory version of each of the epistemic and conscious‐belief approaches.