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The Tractatus Theory of Descriptions
Author(s) -
ROSENKRANTZ MAX
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
theoria
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.34
H-Index - 16
eISSN - 1755-2567
pISSN - 0040-5825
DOI - 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2009.01053.x
Subject(s) - notation , proposition , ideal (ethics) , philosophy , ontology , sign (mathematics) , epistemology , linguistics , identity (music) , frugality , computer science , mathematics , mathematical analysis , ecology , biology , aesthetics
In this article I construe Russell's definite description notation as a fragment of an “ideal language”– a language in which, as Russell puts it in the “Logical Atomism” lectures, “the words in a proposition correspond one by one with the components of the corresponding fact.” Russell's notation – containing as it does variables, quantifiers and the identity sign – commits him to an ontology that is lavish indeed. It thus conflicts with the spirit of the theory of descriptions, which is developed in the service of ontological frugality (the elimination of denoting concepts, senses and non‐existent objects). I make use of arguments derived from the Tractatus to show that an ideal language need not contain logical signs. I thus defend the spirit of the theory of descriptions while departing from its letter.