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Evidentialism and the Numbers Game 1
Author(s) -
REISNER ANDREW E.
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
theoria
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.34
H-Index - 16
eISSN - 1755-2567
pISSN - 0040-5825
DOI - 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2007.tb01210.x
Subject(s) - normative , epistemology , philosophy
This paper poses a puzzle concerning a broadly held view about normative reasons for belief: evidentialism. Evidentialism is the highly intuitive view that the only normative reasons for belief are evidential reasons. I shall argue that in certain circumstances, evidentialism is unable to generate the correct reasons for belief; these reasons can only be provided by other kinds of epistemic reasons apart from evidential ones. I am not arguing that reasons in ordinary cases for belief are non‐evidential, but that evidentialism is too narrow an account of normative reasons for belief to serve as a complete theory of epistemic reasons.