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Violations of normative invariance: Some thoughts on shifty oughts 1
Author(s) -
BYKVIST KRISTER
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
theoria
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.34
H-Index - 16
eISSN - 1755-2567
pISSN - 0040-5825
DOI - 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2007.tb01193.x
Subject(s) - normative , dependency (uml) , action (physics) , warrant , epistemology , psychology , computer science , philosophy , economics , physics , quantum mechanics , artificial intelligence , financial economics
It seems paradoxical to say that an action's normative status ‐ whether it is right, wrong, or obligatory ‐ depends on whether or not it is performed. In this paper, I shall argue that in itself this dependency is not paradoxical. I shall argue that we should not reject a normative theory just because it implies this kind of dependency. Not all dependencies of this kind are bad, or at least not bad enough to warrant wholesale rejection. Instead, we should reject a theory when this dependency makes it a poor guide to action, in particular, when the dependency makes it impossible for agents to comply with the theory.