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Definite Descriptions, Reference, and Inference
Author(s) -
ZOUHAR MARIÁN
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
theoria
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.34
H-Index - 16
eISSN - 1755-2567
pISSN - 0040-5825
DOI - 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2007.tb01186.x
Subject(s) - representation (politics) , argument (complex analysis) , inference , semantics (computer science) , relation (database) , logical consequence , computer science , epistemology , rule of inference , linguistics , natural language processing , artificial intelligence , philosophy , programming language , biochemistry , chemistry , database , politics , political science , law
The paper presents an argument against referential treatment of definite descriptions' semantics. Referentialism with respect to semantics of definite descriptions claims that when descriptions are used referentially, then they are semantically referring expressions. It is argued that this picture does not lead to a satisfactory representation of propositions expressed by utterances involving definite descriptions. For if propositions are what primarily enters the relation of entailment, then referentialism is commited to the view that (i) some inferences usually taken as valid are claimed to be invalid; (ii) some inferences usually taken as invalid are claimed to be valid; (iii) some inferences that are by no means trivially valid must be taken to be such. It is argued that Russellian‐ism with respect to definite descriptions gives us a better representation of propositions expressed by utterances involving descriptions.