Premium
Counterpart Theory and the Argument from Modal Concerns
Author(s) -
BORGE STEFFEN
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
theoria
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.34
H-Index - 16
eISSN - 1755-2567
pISSN - 0040-5825
DOI - 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2006.tb00965.x
Subject(s) - regret , complaint , modal , modality (human–computer interaction) , argument (complex analysis) , epistemology , psychology , sociology , philosophy , mathematics , computer science , political science , medicine , law , artificial intelligence , statistics , chemistry , polymer chemistry
Abstract: Kripke complained that counterpart theory makes modal claims be about counterparts and not about us, and that it is a misguided model of modality since we do not care about counterparts in the same way we care about ourselves. The first part of the complaint, I argue, has been met by Hazen and Lewis, while the second can be countered by observing that most of our modal concerns are about role‐fillers and that counterparts are well‐suited to such concerns. The role‐filler analysis of modal concerns, however, does not seem to capture certain attitudes ‐ especially that of regret. Regret, however, I will argue, is not intrinsically modal and thus is no challenge to my general analysis of modal concerns.