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Revisiting Rawls: A Theory of Justice in the light of Levi's theory of decision
Author(s) -
ANGNER ERIK
Publication year - 2004
Publication title -
theoria
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.34
H-Index - 16
eISSN - 1755-2567
pISSN - 0040-5825
DOI - 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2004.tb00977.x
Subject(s) - irrational number , original position , economic justice , minimax , epistemology , ethical theory , position (finance) , decision theory , political philosophy , politics , reflective equilibrium , sociology , philosophy , positive economics , law and economics , mathematical economics , law , economics , political science , mathematics , geometry , finance , microeconomics
The present paper revisits the issue of rational decision making in John Rawls' original position. Drawing on Isaac Levi's theory of decision, I discuss how we can defend Rawls against John C. Harsanyi's charge that maximin reasoning in the original position is irrational. The discussion suggests that systematic application of Levi's theory is likely to have important consequences for ethics and political theory as well as for public policy