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Good for whom?
Author(s) -
HOLTUG NILS
Publication year - 2003
Publication title -
theoria
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.34
H-Index - 16
eISSN - 1755-2567
pISSN - 0040-5825
DOI - 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2003.tb00750.x
Subject(s) - slogan , identity (music) , egalitarianism , epistemology , law and economics , philosophy , positive economics , economics , law , political science , aesthetics , politics
According to the Levelling Down Objection, (teleological) egalitarianism implausibly implies that it can be in one respect good to bring about equality, even if no‐one benefits from it. Larry Temkin has argued that this objection presupposes a principle he calls the ‘Slogan’. And he has raised two objections to this principle. According to the first, the Slogan gets us into trouble when applied to the so‐called Non‐Identity Problem. According to the second, the Slogan cannot be supported by a substantial theory of well‐being. Against this, I argue that if suitably (and plausibly) modified, the Slogan does not get us into trouble when applied to the Non‐Identity Problem. And I argue that Temkin's case for thinking that the Slogan cannot be supported is hardly conclusive.