Premium
The Contingent and the A Priori
Author(s) -
STERNBERG FREDRIK
Publication year - 2000
Publication title -
theoria
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.34
H-Index - 16
eISSN - 1755-2567
pISSN - 0040-5825
DOI - 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2000.tb01145.x
Subject(s) - a priori and a posteriori , equating , sentence , linguistics , computer science , mathematics , epistemology , mathematical economics , artificial intelligence , philosophy , reading (process)
The traditional equating of the a priori and the necessary was challenged by Kripke, who indicated the possibility of a priori knowledge of contingently true sentences, as well as a posteriori knowledge of necessarily true sentences. This note discusses a new species of sentences with such properties. One example of this is (1) This sentence is necessarily false which appears to be a contingently false sentence, known a priori, although it is hard to see when it might be true. Further examples are considered, and it is argued that the notions of being known a priori and aposteriori should be examined further, along with the notions of necessary and contingent truths.