Good Reasons in Ethics: An Examination of the Toulmin‐Hare Controversy *

I n contemporary life and in contemporary ethical theory there is a good deal of scepticism about the “rational basis of morality”. We are told by some philosophers that morality rests on “The Arbitrary” or that our basic moral principles are but “pure postulates”. It is sometimes said, that in seeking a ground for our moral judgments, we find, in the last analysis, only preferences. Our moral choices, as the existentialists never tire of telling us, are just choices and upon this “arbitrary choice” everything else depends. Thus, there is a sense of urgency about moral questions that we do not find about many other questions that philosophers discuss. As human beings we can hardly avoid making moral judgments, but often, a t least when we reflect, we feel confused about the basis of some or perhaps all of our moral judgments. There