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CONFLICT ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT ALTERNATWE FOR THE MANAYLJNK CANAL 1
Author(s) -
Chadderton Ronald A.
Publication year - 1989
Publication title -
jawra journal of the american water resources association
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.957
H-Index - 105
eISSN - 1752-1688
pISSN - 1093-474X
DOI - 10.1111/j.1752-1688.1989.tb05419.x
Subject(s) - compromise , resource (disambiguation) , property rights , recreation , resource management (computing) , water resources , politics , resource allocation , social benefits , business , economics , environmental economics , law and economics , natural resource economics , microeconomics , public economics , political science , computer science , law , market economy , ecology , computer network , materials science , tailings , metallurgy , biology
The solution of a water resource allocation problem by an alternative social arrangement is presented. Classical Austrian economic theory and the “new resources economics” provide both theoretical and practical evidence to support the development of well‐defined, private property rights to the water resource in question. A conflict analysis demonstrates that management of the Manayunk Canal by a firm would reconcile existing confrontations through compromise use of the water resource. Benefit and cost calculations show that a compromise among industrial and recreational interests, currently competing in the political arena, would increase social benefits.