Premium
Schooling the Cognitive Monster: The Role of Motivation in the Regulation and Control of Prejudice
Author(s) -
Monteith Margo J.,
Lybarger Jill E.,
Woodcock Anna
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
social and personality psychology compass
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.699
H-Index - 53
ISSN - 1751-9004
DOI - 10.1111/j.1751-9004.2009.00177.x
Subject(s) - prejudice (legal term) , psychology , conceptualization , social psychology , cognition , control (management) , monster , construct (python library) , cognitive psychology , controllability , physics , management , quantum mechanics , neuroscience , artificial intelligence , computer science , economics , programming language , mathematics
Motivation has been a central construct in theoretical and empirical efforts to understand the nature of prejudice and stereotyping. We briefly review core motivational underpinnings of prejudice and stereotyping, focusing on aspects of the human condition that help to explain why we are so prone to bias. The strong propensity toward stereotyping and prejudice along with the automatic manner in which intergroup biases often operate have led researchers to question the controllability of such biases (e.g., Bargh's (1999) characterization of stereotyping as a ‘cognitive monster’ that could not be ‘chained’ through efforts at control). We revisit the issue of the controllability of stereotyping and prejudice in light of recent work examining the effects of motivations to control prejudice on regulatory processes. Although a top‐down approach to regulation has been emphasized in much past work (e.g., the conscious replacement of prejudiced associations with more egalitarian thoughts), there is growing evidence that more automated and less effortful bottom‐up regulation is also possible (i.e., a ‘schooling’ of the ‘cognitive monster’). Altogether, the accumulated evidence points to the limitations of dual‐process approaches when applied to understanding the control and regulation of prejudiced responses. The evidence argues instead for a more complex, dynamic, and multi‐level conceptualization of regulation.