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Perception, action, and word meanings in the human brain: the case from action verbs
Author(s) -
Bedny Marina,
Caramazza Alfonso
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
annals of the new york academy of sciences
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.712
H-Index - 248
eISSN - 1749-6632
pISSN - 0077-8923
DOI - 10.1111/j.1749-6632.2011.06013.x
Subject(s) - amodal perception , action (physics) , psychology , perception , comprehension , modality (human–computer interaction) , sensory system , word (group theory) , cognitive psychology , stimulus modality , communication , neuroscience , linguistics , computer science , artificial intelligence , philosophy , physics , quantum mechanics
Among other things, humans talk about what they perceive and do, like “glowing,”“hopping,” and “squeaking.” What is the relationship between our sensory‐motor experiences and word meanings? Does understanding action‐verbs rely on the same neural circuits as seeing and acting? The available evidence indicates that sensory‐motor experience and word meanings are represented in distinct, but interacting systems. Understanding action‐verbs does not rely on early modality‐specific visual or motor circuits. Instead, word comprehension relies on a network of amodal brain regions in the left frontal, temporal, and parietal cortices that represent conceptual and grammatical properties of words. Interactions between word meanings and sensory‐motor experiences occur in higher‐order polymodal brain regions.