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Experimental Game Theory and Behavior Genetics
Author(s) -
Cesarini David,
Dawes Christopher T.,
Johannesson Magnus,
Lichtenstein Paul,
Wallace Björn
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
annals of the new york academy of sciences
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.712
H-Index - 248
eISSN - 1749-6632
pISSN - 0077-8923
DOI - 10.1111/j.1749-6632.2009.04505.x
Subject(s) - ultimatum game , dictator game , dictator , game theory , preference , heritability , psychology , evolutionary game theory , behavioural genetics , inclusive fitness , social psychology , genetic architecture , economics , microeconomics , biology , evolutionary biology , developmental psychology , genetics , quantitative trait locus , political science , politics , gene , law
We summarize the findings from a research program studying the heritability of behavior in a number of widely used economic games, including trust, dictator, and ultimatum games. Results from the standard behavior genetic variance decomposition suggest that strategies and fundamental economic preference parameters are moderately heritable, with estimates ranging from 18 to 42%. In addition, we also report new evidence on so‐called “hyperfair” preferences in the ultimatum game. We discuss the implications of our findings with special reference to current efforts that seek to understand the molecular genetic architecture of complex social behaviors.