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On the Evolution of Misunderstandings about Evolutionary Psychology
Author(s) -
YOUNG JASON,
PERSELL ROGER
Publication year - 2000
Publication title -
annals of the new york academy of sciences
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.712
H-Index - 248
eISSN - 1749-6632
pISSN - 0077-8923
DOI - 10.1111/j.1749-6632.2000.tb06628.x
Subject(s) - nature versus nurture , evolutionary psychology , psychology , trait , cognitive psychology , argument (complex analysis) , cognition , predictability , social psychology , behavioural genetics , epistemology , cognitive science , developmental psychology , sociology , computer science , chemistry , biochemistry , physics , philosophy , quantum mechanics , neuroscience , anthropology , programming language
A bstract : Some of the controversy surrounding evolutionary explanations of human behavior may be due to cognitive information‐processing patterns that are themselves the result of evolutionary processes. Two such patterns are (1) the tendency to oversimplify information so as to reduce demand on cognitive resources and (2) our strong desire to generate predictability and stability from perceptions of the external world. For example, research on social stereotyping has found that people tend to focus automatically on simplified social‐categorical information, to use such information when deciding how to behave, and to rely on such information even in the face of contradictory evidence. Similarly, an undying debate over nature vs. nurture is shaped by various data‐reduction strategies that frequently oversimplify, and thus distort, the intent of the supporting arguments. This debate is also often marked by an assumption that either the nature or the nurture domain may be justifiably excluded at an explanatory level because one domain appears to operate in a sufficiently stable and predictable way for a particular argument. As a result, critiques inveighed against evolutionary explanations of behavior often incorporate simplified‐and erroneous‐assumptions about either the mechanics of how evolution operates or the inevitable implications of evolution for understanding human behavior. The influences of these tendencies are applied to a discussion of the heritability of behavioral characteristics. It is suggested that the common view that Mendelian genetics can explain the heritability of complex behaviors, with a one‐gene‐one‐trait process, is misguided. Complex behaviors are undoubtedly a product of a more complex interaction between genes and environment, ensuring that both nature and nurture must be accommodated in a yet‐to‐be‐developed post‐Mendelian model of genetic influence. As a result, current public perceptions of evolutionary explanations of behavior are handicapped by the lack of clear articulation of the relationship between inherited genes and manifest behavior.