Premium
Local Officials' Incentives and China's Economic Growth: Tournament Thesis Reexamined and Alternative Explanatory Framework
Author(s) -
Su Fubing,
Tao Ran,
Xi Lu,
Li Ming
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
china and world economy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.815
H-Index - 28
eISSN - 1749-124X
pISSN - 1671-2234
DOI - 10.1111/j.1749-124x.2012.01292.x
Subject(s) - economics , sketch , promotion (chess) , incentive , china , explanatory model , politics , tournament , government (linguistics) , public economics , test (biology) , local government , political science , economic system , public administration , microeconomics , law , philosophy , linguistics , mathematics , epistemology , algorithm , combinatorics , computer science , paleontology , biology
To explain China's dramatic economic growth, researchers have proposed a “tournament thesis.” According to this thesis, the central government's ability to set growth targets has played a crucial role in growth since political promotion is largely based on local economic growth. We use provincial officials' career mobility data to test this thesis. For both time periods (1979–1995 and 1979–2002), economic performance, measured in annual, average and relative terms, did not affect these officials' career advancement. We then sketch an alternative analytical framework to explain Chinese local officials' strong urge for developmentalism and, finally, draw policy implications from this explanatory framework.