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Regulation by litigation
Author(s) -
Yandle Bruce,
Dorchak Andrew,
Morriss Andrew P.
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
regulation and governance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.417
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1748-5991
pISSN - 1748-5983
DOI - 10.1111/j.1748-5991.2011.01103.x
Subject(s) - settlement (finance) , duty , law and economics , public interest , economics , public economics , business , industrial organization , law , political science , finance , payment
We believe that careful application of the logic of economics and public choice shines important light on regulation through litigation and can explain at least partly why regulators choose the litigation route, when they choose it, and how the choice may or may not achieve broad goals of efficiency and fairness. We present three case studies: heavy‐duty diesel engines, silica and asbestos, and the tobacco industry's Master Settlement Agreement (MSA).