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Negation, Denial, and Rejection
Author(s) -
Ripley David
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
philosophy compass
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.973
H-Index - 25
ISSN - 1747-9991
DOI - 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00422.x
Subject(s) - negation , denial , assertion , relation (database) , epistemology , phenomenon , psychology , linguistics , philosophy , computer science , psychoanalysis , programming language , database
At least since Frege (1960) and Geach (1965), there has been some consensus about the relation between negation, the speech act of denial, and the attitude of rejection: a denial, the consensus has had it, is the assertion of a negation, and a rejection is a belief in a negation. Recently, though, there have been notable deviations from this orthodox view. Rejectivists have maintained that negation is to be explained in terms of denial or rejection, rather than vice versa. Some other theorists have maintained that negation is a separate phenomenon from denial, and that neither is to be explained in terms of the other. In this paper, I present and consider these heterodox theories of the relation between negation, denial, and rejection