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Empirical Arguments for Group Minds: A Critical Appraisal
Author(s) -
Rupert Robert D.
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
philosophy compass
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.973
H-Index - 25
ISSN - 1747-9991
DOI - 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00420.x
Subject(s) - argument (complex analysis) , occam's razor , cognition , group (periodic table) , psychology , similarity (geometry) , identification (biology) , epistemology , cognitive psychology , computer science , philosophy , artificial intelligence , biochemistry , chemistry , botany , organic chemistry , neuroscience , image (mathematics) , biology
This entry addresses the question of group minds, by focusing specifically on empirical arguments for group cognition and group cognitive states. Two kinds of positive argument are presented and critically evaluated: the argument from individually unintended effects and the argument from functional similarity. A general argument against group cognition – which appeals to Occam’s razor – is also discussed. In the end, much turns on the identification of a mark of the cognitive; proposed marks are briefly (and inconclusively) surveyed in the final section.