Premium
‘Naturalism’ and ‘Skepticism’ in Hume's Treatise of Human Nature
Author(s) -
Greenberg Sean
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
philosophy compass
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.973
H-Index - 25
ISSN - 1747-9991
DOI - 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00143.x
Subject(s) - skepticism , naturalism , philosophy , epistemology , constructive , section (typography) , process (computing) , computer science , advertising , business , operating system
Hume begins the Treatise of Human Nature by announcing the goal of developing a science of man; by the end of Book 1 of the Treatise , the science of man seems to founder in doubt. Underlying the tension between Hume's constructive ambition – his ‘naturalism’– and his doubts about that ambition – his ‘skepticism’– is the question of whether Hume is justified in continuing his philosophical project. In this paper, I explain how this question emerges in the final section of Book 1 of the Treatise , the ‘Conclusion of this Book’, then examine Janet Broughton's and Don Garrett's answers to it, and conclude by sketching a different approach to this question.