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What Theories of Truth Should be Like (but Cannot be)
Author(s) -
Leitgeb Hannes
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
philosophy compass
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.973
H-Index - 25
ISSN - 1747-9991
DOI - 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00070.x
Subject(s) - semantic theory of truth , epistemology , philosophy , computer science
This article outlines what a formal theory of truth should be like, at least at first glance. As not all of the stated constraints can be satisfied at the same time, in view of notorious semantic paradoxes such as the Liar paradox, we consider the maximal consistent combinations of these desiderata and compare their relative advantages and disadvantages.