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Bargaining Power in Multilateral Negotiations on Intellectual Property Rules: Paradox of Weakness
Author(s) -
Karayanidi Milana
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
the journal of world intellectual property
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.334
H-Index - 8
eISSN - 1747-1796
pISSN - 1422-2213
DOI - 10.1111/j.1747-1796.2011.00418.x
Subject(s) - negotiation , intellectual property , bargaining power , trips architecture , context (archaeology) , law and economics , developing country , power (physics) , economics , international trade , business , political science , law , economic growth , microeconomics , computer science , physics , quantum mechanics , paleontology , parallel computing , biology
This article critically analyses the effects of differing bargaining powers between developed and developing countries during international negotiations on intellectual property (IP) rights. While developed countries with stronger bargaining power have the capacity to shape the international IP law in accordance with their interests, developing states are not powerless. Developing countries can gain some concessions by forming coalitions. Additionally, they can achieve their goals by means of a “paradox of weakness”, a concept derived from international conflict resolution. The article elaborates how the paradox is applied in the context of adoption and implementation of the Agreement on Trade‐Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 1994.