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The Effects of Economic Crisis, Domestic Discord, and State Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflict
Author(s) -
Boehmer Charles
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
politics and policy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.259
H-Index - 23
eISSN - 1747-1346
pISSN - 1555-5623
DOI - 10.1111/j.1747-1346.2007.00084.x
Subject(s) - unrest , regime change , democracy , economic interdependence , development economics , economics , state (computer science) , political science , internal conflict , armed conflict , political economy , politics , law , algorithm , computer science
Studies of diversionary conflict typically claim that lower rates of economic growth and domestic unrest increase the risk of militarized interstate conflict. Research shows that these factors are also related to regime changes. Lower rates of economic growth and domestic conflict should increase the risk that governments are overthrown. This article investigates the comparative risk of economic growth and domestic turmoil on militarized interstate conflict and regime changes on a sample of over 100 countries from 1920‐92. I find that higher rates of economic growth are related to violent militarized interstate conflicts and reduce the risk of regime changes. Democracy and economic development likewise provide internal stability and interstate peace. Yet the risk of regime change increases rapidly relative to involvement in an interstate conflict for states affected by high levels of domestic conflict, suggesting that any diversionary strategies are a risky gambit that have a high chance of failure.