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The U.S. Way of War and the “War on Terror”
Author(s) -
LockPullan Richard
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
politics and policy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.259
H-Index - 23
eISSN - 1747-1346
pISSN - 1555-5623
DOI - 10.1111/j.1747-1346.2006.00018.x
Subject(s) - revolution in military affairs , military science , military theory , military strategy , political science , military operations other than war , operational level of war , politics , strategic studies , war on terror , military sociology , vietnam war , strategic goal , grand strategy , iraq war , political economy , spanish civil war , law , red army's tactics in world war ii , sociology
Focusing on the two most significant deployments of U.S. military force in the ‘global war on terror,’ this article examines U.S. military strategy after September 11, 2001. The main thesis is that the post‐9/11 U.S. military strategy is a product of a revised ‘way of war’ that was developed by U.S. armed forces after Vietnam and the first Gulf War, rather than by significant aspects of the post‐9/11 environment. The article highlights the influence of the U.S. Army on American strategic culture and the subsequent reliance of the army on technology and conventional warfare—a strategy that eschews the broader social and political implications of warfare. Military outcomes in both Iraq and Afghanistan are seen as reflective of the shortcomings inherent within the model of military strategy that the U.S. Army, in particular, has developed over the last 30 years. The article explains the particular emphases in U.S. grand strategy and recurrent weaknesses in the U.S. response to 9/11.