Premium
The President's Legislative Program: An Issue of Sincere versus Strategic Behavior
Author(s) -
Steger Wayne P.
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
politics and policy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.259
H-Index - 23
eISSN - 1747-1346
pISSN - 1555-5623
DOI - 10.1111/j.1747-1346.2005.tb00645.x
Subject(s) - setter , presidential system , legislature , outcome (game theory) , odds , politics , political science , legislation , position (finance) , public administration , law and economics , law , public relations , economics , computer science , logistic regression , archaeology , mathematical economics , finance , machine learning , history
Do the president s legislative proposals embody the president's sincere preferences or strategic modifications intended to improve the chances of obtaining a particular outcome? Students of presidential agenda‐setting typically assume a sincere preferences approach, while students of congressional agenda‐setting have long accepted the possibility of strategic behavior. This essay first reviews this debate and presents arguments supporting a “strategic” agenda‐setter position. It then considers the methods by which administrations estimate the likelihood of passing legislation in Congress. I posit that estimations of the political feasibility of a bill conform to a Bayesian updating model of strategic agenda‐setting choice. The essay then presents propositions about the conditions in which administrations are likely to act sincerely or strategically. Whether presidential administrations pursue the president s sincere preferences or modify/ their proposals to improve the odds of passing a bill are the result of calculated decisions that seek to maximize the president's outcome.