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LEGISLATIVE PROFESSIONALISM AND INFLUENCE ON STATE AGENCIES
Author(s) -
Baranowski Michael
Publication year - 2001
Publication title -
politics and policy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.259
H-Index - 23
eISSN - 1747-1346
pISSN - 1555-5623
DOI - 10.1111/j.1747-1346.2001.tb00587.x
Subject(s) - legislature , principal (computer security) , state (computer science) , political science , legislative intent , underpinning , test (biology) , public administration , legislative process , law , engineering , paleontology , civil engineering , algorithm , computer science , biology , operating system
This research focuses on the relationship between state legislative professionalism and legislative influence in state agencies. Principal‐agent theory, which provides the theoretical underpinning for this research, suggests that there should be a positive relationship between legislative professionalism and legislative influence. King's (2000) legislative professionalism measure, along with a 1995 survey of state administrators in 15 states, are used to test this theory. The results of this analysis show that while there is a statistically significant relationship between legislative professionalism and legislative influence in agencies, the relationship is not in the expected direction. Additionally, legislative professionalism is not the strongest of the examined predictors of legislative influence. While the increased legislative capability of more professionalized legislatures may make them better able to influence agencies, based on these findings they do not appear to be particularly interested in exerting more influence over agencies. Potential reasons for which are discussed.