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Economic Development Choices and the Politics of Violence in Latin America
Author(s) -
Wood Stephen P.
Publication year - 1999
Publication title -
southeastern political review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1747-1346
pISSN - 0730-2177
DOI - 10.1111/j.1747-1346.1999.tb00535.x
Subject(s) - politics , formality , latin americans , property rights , political economy , political science , democracy , diversification (marketing strategy) , civil society , terrorism , government (linguistics) , language change , development economics , economics , law , business , linguistics , philosophy , marketing , art , literature
Do the economic development choices made by political elites impact political participation? Shepsle and North argue that to facilitate development political leaders must formalize those institutions protecting property and contract rights. The relationship between “institutional formality” and economic diversification has been empirically substantiated by Wood and Snider, who also find that political outcomes (growth in government size, transitions toward democracy) are sensitive to structural changes. Specifically, does the structural shift toward market driven development mitigate violent political participation? Does civil war or political terrorism give way to more peaceful politics as economies liberalize? Using data for eleven Latin American countries and OLS, the results are auspicious. They show that, consistent with Snider and Wood, when elites choose to institutionally protect property and contract rights and follow a market driven model, they dampen violent political participation and encourage peaceful political participation.