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FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY POLICY MAKING BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
Author(s) -
Kilvein John C.,
Brisbin Richard A.
Publication year - 1998
Publication title -
southeastern political review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1747-1346
pISSN - 0730-2177
DOI - 10.1111/j.1747-1346.1998.tb00510.x
Subject(s) - supreme court , agency (philosophy) , political science , certiorari , law , context (archaeology) , politics , presidency , judicial review , supreme court decisions , public administration , original jurisdiction , sociology , paleontology , social science , biology
This article examines the reasons for the Supreme Court of the United States' support for federal agency policy choices through an examination of cases litigated from 1953 to 1991. Three explanations of the Court's support of agency policy choices are evaluated. The attitudinal explanation posits that the Court supports agency policy because it agrees with the political ideology of agency policy. The legal context explanation postulates that the Court should defer to agency policy choices except in personal freedoms issues. A political context explanation hypothesizes that the decisions of the Court will be influenced by party control of the presidency and Congress, the agency's policy agenda or constitutional status, or the characteristics of the private party litigating against the agency. Logit analysis of separate models of the Court's support of liberal and conservative agency policy choices using public record data and the United States Supreme Court Judicial Database are used to evaluate the explanations. The conclusions indicate that the attitudinal characteristics of the justices, the legal context in which the agency is appealing to the Court, and the presence of an independent agency as a party all have a significant effect on the Court's support for agency policy choices.