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RATIONAL CHOICE AND SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING: A REVIEW ESSAY
Author(s) -
Brenner Saul
Publication year - 1998
Publication title -
southeastern political review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1747-1346
pISSN - 0730-2177
DOI - 10.1111/j.1747-1346.1998.tb00486.x
Subject(s) - supreme court , majority opinion , voting , outcome (game theory) , certiorari , political science , empirical research , judicial opinion , law , epistemology , economics , politics , original jurisdiction , mathematical economics , philosophy
This review essay offers a broad overview of the history of the uses of rational choice theory to study decision making on the Supreme Court and presents and critiques two topics from the past. The first involves the size of the opinion coalitions on the Court and the second concerns the outcome‐prediction strategy in certiorari voting. The two models regarding the size of the opinion coalitions are shown to be based on unrealistic assumptions, while there is empirical support for the outcome‐prediction strategy. These mixed results are explained. This essay also suggests a list of questions for possible future research.