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THE LEGISLATIVE STRATEGIES OF INDEPENDENT AND THIRD PARTY EXECUTIVES
Author(s) -
Taylor Andrew J.
Publication year - 1998
Publication title -
southeastern political review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1747-1346
pISSN - 0730-2177
DOI - 10.1111/j.1747-1346.1998.tb00469.x
Subject(s) - legislature , obligation , governor , politics , political science , public administration , government (linguistics) , divided government , institution , state (computer science) , legislative process , public relations , business , law , engineering , linguistics , philosophy , algorithm , computer science , aerospace engineering
Recent developments in state and national politics have presented political scientists with an obligation and opportunity to study independent and third party executives. This article examines the legislative strategies that are available to such executives as they attempt to turn their policy preferences into government output. The article examines the case of Connecticut Governor Lowell P. Weicker, Jr., and his income tax proposal in 1991 and reveals, somewhat surprisingly, that independent executives can and probably must use the institution of party to get what they want from the legislative process. Perhaps more predictably, the article shows that independent executives will readily tap the formal powers of their office to ensure success for their agenda. It is also argued that such executives need not rely solely on public support for legislative success and that, despite a lack of formal partisan connections, they can be successful when directly lobbying legislators.