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THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE RELIGION CASES: UNSETTLED CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Author(s) -
Mauney Connie P.
Publication year - 1995
Publication title -
southeastern political review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1747-1346
pISSN - 0730-2177
DOI - 10.1111/j.1747-1346.1995.tb00425.x
Subject(s) - law , jurisprudence , divergence (linguistics) , political science , free exercise clause , supreme court , interpretation (philosophy) , economic justice , establishment clause , roberts court , sociology , first amendment , philosophy , linguistics
In recent years the Rehnquist Court's interpretation of the religion clauses has been characterized chiefly by division and uncertainty. In numerous opinions, various members of the Court have defended and challenged traditional definitions and tests applied by earlier courts to First Amendment free exercise and establishment clause issues. By the mid‐1990s the wide divergence of views revealed a fractured Court with little or no leadership on the part of the Chief Justice. The religion cases examined in this article illustrate how the Court has incrementally modified constitutional law. Selective analysis of judicial opinions supports the conclusion that the justices have often distinguished precedents and reevaluated Courtmade tests, producing results in individual decisions that adhere to no distinct pattern. The Rehnquist Court, while frequently challenging traditional interpretations, has nevertheless been reluctant to attempt basic doctrinal innovation in this area of First Amendment jurisprudence.