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THE ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF COALITION BEHAVIOR
Author(s) -
Posey Kevin H.
Publication year - 1994
Publication title -
southeastern political review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1747-1346
pISSN - 0730-2177
DOI - 10.1111/j.1747-1346.1994.tb00345.x
Subject(s) - negotiation , political science , punishment (psychology) , position (finance) , political economy , outcome (game theory) , law and economics , law , social psychology , economics , psychology , microeconomics , finance
This paper is an examination of the possibility that electoral punishment for a party's choice of coalitions does exist. Previous writings have inferred that this is not the case. It has been an assumption that voters forget their parties' transgressions. This frees the party leadership to negotiate in the coalition bargaining process without regard to the previous election's outcome. However, while punishment may not take place in all cases, it does appear to occur in some. According to the election results taken from elections following the postwar “Grand Coalitions,” it would appear that the leaders of small, lefrist parties have something to worry about. They are not free to bargain without paying heed to their supporters. it is therefore unlikely that they are unaware of their constrained position, given the party leadership's understandable desire to maintain a respectable presence in the next election cycle.