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DO INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND PROGRAMS IMPACT ON THE SACRIFICE RATIO?
Author(s) -
MOORE Winston R.
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
the developing economies
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.305
H-Index - 30
eISSN - 1746-1049
pISSN - 0012-1533
DOI - 10.1111/j.1746-1049.2009.00083.x
Subject(s) - economics , credibility , inflation (cosmology) , balance of payments , commit , output gap , monetary economics , monetary policy , payment , terms of trade , balance of trade , macroeconomics , international economics , finance , physics , database , theoretical physics , political science , computer science , law
From time to time, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) makes resources available to member states for short‐term balance‐of‐payments support under an agreed arrangement know as a program. Most IMF programs include quantitative performance criteria for key macroeconomic variables, which borrowers must meet to obtain Fund resources. Standard open economy models predict that if policymakers are able to credibly commit to reducing inflation, rational economic agents will lower their expectations of inflation and, therefore, the trade‐off between inflation and output will fall. The present study tests whether IMF programs, by lending credibility to a country's adjustment program, influence the inflation–output trade‐off. The results from the study suggest that IMF programs do not significantly influence the inflation–output trade‐off. This finding is robust to changes in the estimation approach, the method used to obtain the output gap estimates and outliers.